Regular probability comparisons imply the Banach-Tarski paradox

DOI10.1007/s11229-014-0458-6zbMath1310.03008OpenAlexW2095343886MaRDI QIDQ2263052

Alexander R. Pruss

Publication date: 17 March 2015

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0458-6

zbMATH Keywords

regularitydecision theoryprobabilityset theoryrationalityaxiom of choiceBayesianismcredenceincommensurabilitynonmeasurable sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05) Axiom of choice and related propositions (03E25)

Related Items

The strength of de Finetti's coherence theorem ⋮ Non-classical probabilities invariant under symmetries ⋮ Popper functions, uniform distributions and infinite sequences of heads

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