On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel-fringe game
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Publication:2276540
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.06.008zbMath1260.91104OpenAlexW1975433398MaRDI QIDQ2276540
Hassan Benchekroun, Cees A. A. M. Withagen
Publication date: 6 November 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.06.008
dynamic gamesnonrenewable resourcescarteldominant firm versus fringeprice takingfringeopen-loop versus closed-loop strategies
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamic games (91A25)
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