On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel-fringe game
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3866998 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3780892 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 706270 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1734466 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of 'Oil'Igopoly: Cournot Equilibrium in Exhaustible Resource Markets with Fixed Supplies
- Microeconomic theory
- Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
- Oligopoly equilibria in nonrenewable resource markets
- On Oligopolistic Markets for Nonrenewable Natural Resources
- On Two Folk Theorems Concerning the Extraction of Exhaustible Resources
- On nonrenewable resource oligopolies: the asymmetric case
- Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players
- Small efficient scale as a foundation for Walrasian equilibrium
- Strong time-consistency in the cartel-versus-fringe model
- The limit points of monopolistic competition
Cited in
(7)- Stackelberg versus Cournot: a differential game approach
- Temporary natural resource cartels
- An oligopoly-fringe non-renewable resource game in the presence of a renewable substitute
- Dynamic games between firms and infinitely lived consumers: a review of the literature
- Strong time-consistency in the cartel-versus-fringe model
- An oligopoly-fringe model with HARA preferences
- Backward induction algorithm for a class of closed-loop Stackelberg games
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