On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel-fringe game

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.06.008zbMath1260.91104OpenAlexW1975433398MaRDI QIDQ2276540

Hassan Benchekroun, Cees A. A. M. Withagen

Publication date: 6 November 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.06.008

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesnonrenewable resourcescarteldominant firm versus fringeprice takingfringeopen-loop versus closed-loop strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items

Backward induction algorithm for a class of closed-loop Stackelberg games ⋮ An oligopoly-fringe model with HARA preferences ⋮ Stackelberg versus Cournot: a differential game approach ⋮ An oligopoly-fringe non-renewable resource game in the presence of a renewable substitute ⋮ Dynamic games between firms and infinitely lived consumers: a review of the literature

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