Informal and absolute proofs: some remarks from a Gödelian perspective

DOI10.1007/s11245-017-9515-3zbMath1428.03013OpenAlexW2767368731WikidataQ113900464 ScholiaQ113900464MaRDI QIDQ2288278

Gabriella Crocco

Publication date: 17 January 2020

Published in: Topoi (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9515-3

zbMATH Keywords

Gödelaxiomaticsinformal rigourphilosophy of logicabsolute proofs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items (1)

Logical Foundations and Kant's Principles of Formal Logic

Cites Work

• Informal proofs and mathematical rigour
• Church's thesis and the ideal of informal rigour
• Gödel on deduction
• Finite Axiomatizability using additional predicates
• Obituary: John R. Myhill (1923–1987)
• Why Do We Prove Theorems?
• Gödel on Concepts
• Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals^†
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