Why Do We Prove Theorems?
DOI10.1093/PHILMAT/7.1.5zbMATH Open0941.03003OpenAlexW2320543258MaRDI QIDQ4237642FDOQ4237642
Authors: Yehuda Rav 
Publication date: 31 July 2000
Published in: Philosophia Mathematica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/14aea25b4389e79399e553922425c8a44a88bc70
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continuum hypothesisGoldbach conjectureprobabilistic algorithmsconception of mathematical proofhistorical description of the activity of proving
Methodology of mathematics (00A35) Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) History of mathematical logic and foundations (03-03) Development of contemporary mathematics (01A65)
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