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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2113550 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Saving Proof from Paradox: Gödel’s Paradox and the Inconsistency of Informal Mathematics
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- Proofs, pictures, and Euclid
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- Pi on earth, or mathematics in the real world
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