Why Do We Prove Theorems?

DOI10.1093/PHILMAT/7.1.5MaRDI QIDQ4237642zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yehuda Rav

Publication date 31 July 2000

Published in Philosophia Mathematica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/14aea25b4389e79399e553922425c8a44a88bc70

zbMATH Keywords

continuum hypothesisGoldbach conjectureprobabilistic algorithmsconception of mathematical proofhistorical description of the activity of proving

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Methodology of mathematics (00A35) Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) History of mathematical logic and foundations (03-03) Development of contemporary mathematics (01A65)

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