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- Cutting up graphs revisited -- a short proof of Stallings' structure theorem.
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- Diagrams and Proofs in Analysis
- Forms and roles of diagrams in knot theory
- Heterogeneous Reasoning and Its Logic
- How to think about informal proofs
- Informal proof, formal proof, formalism
- Mathematical knowledge and the interplay of practices
- On formal and informal provability
- On proof and progress in mathematics
- Proofs, pictures, and Euclid
- Prove—Once More and Again
- Representation and productive ambiguity in mathematics and the sciences
- Reuben Hersh. Experiencing Mathematics: What Do We Do, When We Do Mathematics?. Providence, Rhode Island: American Mathematical Society, 2014. ISBN 978-0-8218-9420-0. Pp. xvii + 291
- Skills and mathematical knowledge
- The Derivation-Indicator View of Mathematical Practice
- The relationship of derivations in artificial languages to ordinary rigorous mathematical proof
- Towards a new epistemology of mathematics
- Why Do We Believe Theorems?
- Why Do We Prove Theorems?
- Why do informal proofs conform to formal norms?
- Why do mathematicians need different ways of presenting mathematical objects? The case of Cayley graphs
- Why the Naïve Derivation Recipe Model Cannot Explain How Mathematicians’ Proofs Secure Mathematical Knowledge
- `Chasing' the diagram -- the use of visualizations in algebraic reasoning
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(11)- That we \textit{see} that some diagrammatic proofs are perfectly rigorous
- The material reasoning of folding paper
- The role of syntactic representations in set theory
- Geometry of Euclidean tetrahedra and knot invariants
- Reconciling \textit{Rigor and intuition}
- Rigour and intuition
- On mathematical towers of Babel and ``translation as an epistemic category
- On fluidity of the textual transmission in Abraham bar Ḥiyya's \textit{Ḥibbur ha-Meshiḥah ve-ha-Tishboret}
- Mathematical formalization and diagrammatic reasoning: the case study of the braid group between 1925 and 1950
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5588640 (Why is no real title available?)
- RIGOUR AND PROOF
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