A problem with the dependence of informal proofs on formal proofs

DOI10.1093/PHILMAT/NKV008MaRDI QIDQ2965627zbMATHOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Fenner Stanley Tanswell

Publication date 3 March 2017

Published in Philosophia Mathematica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkv008

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30)

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• MATHEMATICAL RIGOR AND PROOF
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• The role of syntactic representations in set theory
• Does Mathematics Need Foundations?
• Audience role in mathematical proof development
• Many-valued logic of informal provability: a non-deterministic strategy
• Acceptable gaps in mathematical proofs
• Towards mathematical AI via a model of the content and process of mathematical question and answer dialogues
• Reconciling \textit{Rigor and intuition}
• Mathematical inference and logical inference
• The relationship of derivations in artificial languages to ordinary rigorous mathematical proof
• Visual proofs as counterexamples to the \textit{standard view} of informal mathematical proofs?
• Non-deterministic logic of informal provability has no finite characterization
• From Euclidean geometry to knots and nets
• Why Do We Believe Theorems?
• RIGOUR AND PROOF
• Reliability of mathematical inference

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