Saving Proof from Paradox: Gödel’s Paradox and the Inconsistency of Informal Mathematics
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Publication:5213764
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-40220-8_11zbMath1429.03048OpenAlexW2558172047MaRDI QIDQ5213764
Publication date: 4 February 2020
Published in: Logical Studies of Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science and Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://figshare.com/articles/Saving_proof_from_paradox_G_del_s_paradox_and_the_inconsistency_of_informal_mathematics/9589094
Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Paraconsistent logics (03B53) Gödel numberings and issues of incompleteness (03F40)
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Cites Work
- How to think about informal proofs
- Informal proofs and mathematical rigour
- Why Do We Prove Theorems?
- Prove—Once More and Again
- The Derivation-Indicator View of Mathematical Practice
- The Different Ways in which Logic is (said to be) Formal
- Mathematical pluralism
- On Godel Sentences and What They Say
- A Critique of a Formalist-Mechanist Version of the Justification of Arguments in Mathematicians' Proof Practices
- How to Nominalize Formalism†
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