Climb on the bandwagon: consensus and periodicity in a lifetime utility model with strategic interactions

DOI10.1007/S13235-019-00299-YzbMATH Open1431.91026arXiv1804.07469OpenAlexW2963185692WikidataQ128298226 ScholiaQ128298226MaRDI QIDQ2292117FDOQ2292117

Authors: Elena Sartori, Marco Tolotti, Paolo Dai Pra 

Publication date: 3 February 2020

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: What is the emergent long-run equilibrium of a society where many interacting agents bet on the optimal energy to put in place in order to climb on the Bandwagon? In this paper we study the collective behavior of a large population of agents being either Left or Right: the core idea is that agents benefit from being with the winner party, but, on the other hand, they suffer a cost in changing their status quo. At the microscopic level the model is formulated as a stochastic, symmetric dynamic game with $N$ players. In the macroscopic limit as $Nightarrow+infty$, we obtain a mean field game whose equilibria describe the "rational" collective behavior of the society. It is of particular interest to detect the emerging long-time attractors, e.g. consensus or oscillating behavior. Significantly, we discover that bandwagoning can be persistent at the macro level: endogenously generated periodicity is in fact detected.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.07469

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zbMATH Keywords

consensusmean field gamesopinion dynamicssocial interactionsmultiple Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Mean field games (aspects of game theory) (91A16)

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Cited In (5)

• On the Convergence Problem in Mean Field Games: A Two State Model without Uniqueness
• Mean-field game modeling the bandwagon effect with activation costs
• Strategic interaction in trend-driven dynamics
• Path-space moderate deviations for a class of Curie-Weiss models with dissipation
• Polarization and coherence in mean field games driven by private and social utility

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