Products liability when consumers are salient thinkers

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.108844MaRDI QIDQ2292813zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tim Friehe, Cat Lam Pham

Publication date 5 February 2020

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108844

zbMATH Keywords

competitionproduct liabilitysalience

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Recommendations

• Products liability, consumer misperceptions, and the allocation of consumers to firms
• On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability
• Why product liability may lower product safety
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Cites work

• Competition for attention
• Salience, competition, and decoy goods

Cited in

(10)

• Product safety for a monopolist under strict liability
• On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability
• Why product liability may lower product safety
• Uncertain product risk, information acquisition, and product liability
• Smart products: liability, investments in product safety, and the timing of market introduction
• Product liability, multidimensional R\&D and innovation
• Products liability, consumer misperceptions, and the allocation of consumers to firms
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3916454 (Why is no real title available?)
• Settling with salience-biased defendants
• Product liability and the virtues of asymmetric information

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