Product liability and the virtues of asymmetric information

DOI10.1007/S00712-010-0123-6MaRDI QIDQ972732zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Florian Baumann, Tim Friehe

Publication date 21 May 2010

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-126824

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationsignalingproduct liabilitycare leveltort law

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5200101 (Why is no real title available?)
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

Cited in

(6)

• Products liability, consumer misperceptions, and the allocation of consumers to firms
• On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability
• Uncertain product risk, information acquisition, and product liability
• Why product liability may lower product safety
• Forecasting product liability claims. Epidemiology and modeling in the Manville asbestos case. Foreword by the honorable Jack B. Weinstein.
• EX ANTE INVESTMENT, EX POST REMEDIES, AND PRODUCT LIABILITY*

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