Product liability and the virtues of asymmetric information
DOI10.1007/S00712-010-0123-6zbMATH Open1229.91139OpenAlexW2033136625MaRDI QIDQ972732FDOQ972732
Authors: Florian Baumann, Tim Friehe 
Publication date: 21 May 2010
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-126824
Recommendations
- Uncertain product risk, information acquisition, and product liability
- Products liability, consumer misperceptions, and the allocation of consumers to firms
- EX ANTE INVESTMENT, EX POST REMEDIES, AND PRODUCT LIABILITY*
- On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability
- Products liability when consumers are salient thinkers
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)
Cites Work
Cited In (6)
- EX ANTE INVESTMENT, EX POST REMEDIES, AND PRODUCT LIABILITY*
- Forecasting product liability claims. Epidemiology and modeling in the Manville asbestos case. Foreword by the honorable Jack B. Weinstein.
- On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability
- Why product liability may lower product safety
- Uncertain product risk, information acquisition, and product liability
- Products liability, consumer misperceptions, and the allocation of consumers to firms
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