Product liability and the virtues of asymmetric information

DOI10.1007/S00712-010-0123-6zbMATH Open1229.91139OpenAlexW2033136625MaRDI QIDQ972732FDOQ972732

Tim Friehe, Florian Baumann

Publication date: 21 May 2010

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-126824

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationsignalingproduct liabilitycare leveltort law

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

Cited In (3)

• EX ANTE INVESTMENT, EX POST REMEDIES, AND PRODUCT LIABILITY*
• Forecasting product liability claims. Epidemiology and modeling in the Manville asbestos case. Foreword by the honorable Jack B. Weinstein.
• Why product liability may lower product safety

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