Pricing and coordination strategy in a green supply chain with a risk-averse retailer
Summary: This paper addresses the pricing and coordination strategy in a green supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a green product and sells it to a risk-averse retailer. The product's demand is a random variable influenced by the green level and the retail price. The problem is modeled in three different structures, a centralized and two decentralized models, in which the upstream manufacturer and the downstream retailer act as the channel leader, respectively. This paper presents the optimal decisions for all supply chain members, analyzes the effects of green degree and risk-averse coefficient on the supply chain members' decision-making and their profits, and performs the numerical analysis. The results show that the green degree and the whole supply chain's expected profits are highest in the centralized scenario, followed by the retailer-led scenario, and lowest under the manufacturer-led scenario; the green degree and the manufacturer's expected profit increase with the risk-averse coefficient, no matter who dominates the channel; however, the risk-averse coefficient's effects on the retailer's expected utility and the retail price depends on who dominates the channel and on the greening investment parameter.
- Green product design and pricing decisions in a risk-averse supply chain under alternative power structures
- Decision-making and coordination of green supply chain with risk aversion under government subsidies
- Optimal decision-making for green supply chain considering retailer's fairness concern and risk aversion
- Implications of risk aversion behavior on the green product promotion strategy under manufacturer encroachment
- Coordinating a supply chain with green innovation in a dynamic setting
- Impacts of retailer's risk averse behaviors on quick response fashion supply chain systems
- Mean-variance analysis of a single supplier and retailer supply chain under a returns policy
- Research on coordination mechanism in three-level green supply chain under non-cooperative game
- The impact of alternative performance measures on single-period inventory policy
- Transferring and sharing exchange-rate risk in a risk-averse supply chain of a multinational firm
- Research on pricing and coordination strategy of a sustainable green supply chain with a capital-constrained retailer
- Pricing policies for dual-channel supply chain with green investment and sales effort under uncertain demand
- Information structure selection in a green supply chain: impacts of wholesale price and greenness level
- Coordinating a supply chain with green innovation in a dynamic setting
- Optimal selection of cleaner products in a green supply chain with risk aversion
- Implications of risk aversion behavior on the green product promotion strategy under manufacturer encroachment
- Evergreening and operational risk under price competition
- Decision-making and coordination of green supply chain with risk aversion under government subsidies
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7156448 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7070888 (Why is no real title available?)
- Optimal decision-making for green supply chain considering retailer's fairness concern and risk aversion
- Supply Chain Management of Marginal Cost-Intensive Green Products under Random Demand Model
- Green product design and pricing decisions in a risk-averse supply chain under alternative power structures
- Product pricing, green effort decisions and coordination in a dynamic three-echelon green supply chain
- Coordination of an environmentally responsible supply chain with cost disturbance under carbon price fluctuations
- Green supply chain analysis under cost sharing contract with uncertain information based on confidence level
This page was built for publication: Pricing and coordination strategy in a green supply chain with a risk-averse retailer
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2298762)
