Revealed norm obedience

DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0830-YzbMATH Open1318.91051OpenAlexW1986066079MaRDI QIDQ2353694FDOQ2353694

Authors: Andreas Tutić 

Publication date: 16 July 2015

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0830-y

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Cites Work

• Rational choice with status quo bias
• Never choose the uniquely largest. A characterization
• When more is less: limited consideration
• Choice by lexicographic semiorders
• (A,f): Choice with Frames¹
• Rationalization
• Eliciting welfare preferences from behavioural data sets
• Beyond revealed preference: choice-theoretic foundations for behavioral welfare economics
• Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?
• Akrasia, instincts and revealed preferences
• Choice problems with a `reference' point
• On the structure of choice under different external references
• On rationalizability of choice functions: a characterization of the median
• Fairness and the roads not taken: An experimental test of non-reciprocal set-dependence in distributive preferences

Cited In (2)

• Objective and subjective compliance: a norm-based explanation of `moral wiggle room'
• The permissible and the forbidden

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