Objective and subjective compliance: a norm-based explanation of `moral wiggle room'

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.11.007MaRDI QIDQ263394zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Arne Weiss, Kai Spiekermann

Publication date 5 April 2016

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64643/

zbMATH Keywords

experimentuncertaintydictator gamenorm complianceself-serving biasesstrategic learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites work

• Do I really want to know? A cognitive dissonance-based explanation of other-regarding behavior
• Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
• Identity, morals, and taboos: beliefs as assets

Cited in

(7)

• Debiasing preferences over redistribution: an experiment
• COMPLIANCE AND COMMAND II, IMPERATIVES AND DEONTICS
• Intention-based sharing
• Descriptive social norms as underappreciated sources of social control
• Moral norms in a partly compliant society
• Are moral norms distinct from social norms? A critical assessment of Jon Elster and Cristina Bicchieri
• It's not a lie if you believe the norm does not apply: conditional norm-following and belief distortion

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Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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