Bridging the intuition gap in Cox's theorem: a Jaynesian argument for universality
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Publication:2374509
DOI10.1016/j.ijar.2016.08.002zbMath1401.62015OpenAlexW2514164592MaRDI QIDQ2374509
Travis Waddington, Aubrey Clayton
Publication date: 15 December 2016
Published in: International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2016.08.002
Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Reasoning under uncertainty in the context of artificial intelligence (68T37)
Related Items
Cites Work
- The logical view of conditioning and its application to possibility and evidence theories
- Constructing a logic of plausible inference: A guide to Cox's theorem.
- Scaled Boolean algebras
- The philosophical significance of Cox's theorem
- The Uncertain Reasoner's Companion
- Probability, Frequency and Reasonable Expectation
- New axioms for rigorous Bayesian probability
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