Strengthening the security of authenticated key exchange against bad randomness
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Publication:2413007
DOI10.1007/s10623-017-0337-5zbMath1426.94096OpenAlexW2588528865MaRDI QIDQ2413007
Michèle Feltz, C. J. F. Cremers
Publication date: 6 April 2018
Published in: Designs, Codes and Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:909107fa-62b5-41d2-aeda-98fc7a697290
security modelsauthenticated key exchange (AKE)chosen randomnessstateful protocolsstateless protocols
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- Resettable Public-Key Encryption: How to Encrypt on a Virtual Machine
- HMQV: A High-Performance Secure Diffie-Hellman Protocol
- Examining Indistinguishability-Based Proof Models for Key Establishment Protocols
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