Critique of the related-key attack concept
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Publication:2430685
The author describes a new related-key attack against generic ciphers which requires \(O(1)\) work to distinguish a cipher from random and \(O({\text{key length}})\) to recover the key. This attack makes questionable the related-key attacks that have been considered earlier and seems to require re-formulation of the whole concept of related-key attack.
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Cites work
- Formalizing human ignorance
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- New types of cryptanalytic attacks using related keys
- Related-Key Boomerang and Rectangle Attacks
- Related-Key Cryptanalysis of the Full AES-192 and AES-256
- The Ideal-Cipher Model, Revisited: An Uninstantiable Blockcipher-Based Hash Function
Cited in
(7)- Clever arbiters versus malicious adversaries. On the gap between known-input security and chosen-input security
- A related-key attack on iterated chaotic ciphers
- Related-key attack on 5-round Kuznyechik
- A Unified Approach to Related-Key Attacks
- Reflection ciphers
- Information Security
- On the related-key attack security of authenticated encryption schemes
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