Flexible and committed profit sharing with wage bargaining: implications for equilibrium unemployment
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Publication:2432065
DOI10.1007/S00712-005-0164-4zbMATH Open1138.91585OpenAlexW2002675891MaRDI QIDQ2432065FDOQ2432065
Authors: Erkki Koskela, Rune Stenbacka 
Publication date: 25 October 2006
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-005-0164-4
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Cites Work
- Efficiency wages and union--firm bargaining
- Efficiency wages and the long-run incidence of progressive taxation.
- Interactions between the efficiency wage and insider-outsider theories
- Employment Determination in British Industry: Investigations Using Micro- Data
- On the interaction between efficiency wages and union-firm bargaining models
Cited In (5)
- Profit sharing and relative consumption
- Shape of wage-profit curves in joint production systems: evidence from the supply and use tables of the Finnish economy
- Profit sharing and strike activity in Cournot oligopoly
- The fixed wage puzzle: why profit sharing is so hard to implement
- Labor in the boardroom
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