Flexible and committed profit sharing with wage bargaining: implications for equilibrium unemployment

DOI10.1007/S00712-005-0164-4MaRDI QIDQ2432065zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Erkki Koskela, Rune Stenbacka

Publication date 25 October 2006

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-005-0164-4

zbMATH Keywords

wage bargainingprofit sharingequilibrium unemploymentemployee effort

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99)

Recommendations

• Profit Sharing, Employment Efficiency and Wage Stability
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Cites work

• Efficiency wages and the long-run incidence of progressive taxation.
• Efficiency wages and union--firm bargaining
• Employment Determination in British Industry: Investigations Using Micro- Data
• Interactions between the efficiency wage and insider-outsider theories
• On the interaction between efficiency wages and union-firm bargaining models

Cited in

(5)

• Profit sharing and relative consumption
• Profit sharing and strike activity in Cournot oligopoly
• Shape of wage-profit curves in joint production systems: evidence from the supply and use tables of the Finnish economy
• The fixed wage puzzle: why profit sharing is so hard to implement
• Labor in the boardroom

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