Flexible and committed profit sharing with wage bargaining: implications for equilibrium unemployment

DOI10.1007/s00712-005-0164-4zbMath1138.91585OpenAlexW2002675891MaRDI QIDQ2432065

Rune Stenbacka, Erkki Koskela

Publication date: 25 October 2006

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-005-0164-4

zbMATH Keywords

wage bargainingequilibrium unemploymentprofit sharingemployee effort

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99)

Related Items (1)

The fixed wage puzzle: why profit sharing is so hard to implement

Cites Work

• Interactions between the efficiency wage and insider-outsider theories
• On the interaction between efficiency wages and union-firm bargaining models
• Efficiency wages and union--firm bargaining
• Efficiency wages and the long-run incidence of progressive taxation.
• Employment Determination in British Industry: Investigations Using Micro- Data

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