Observability of information acquisition in agency models

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.01.015MaRDI QIDQ2444459zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eva I. Hoppe

Publication date 9 April 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.01.015

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionhidden informationinformation gathering

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Recommendations

• Informed principal and information gathering agent
• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
• Timing of information in agency problems with hidden actions
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• GATHERING INFORMATION BY A PARTIALLY INFORMED AGENT

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