Markets and rent dissipation in regulated open access fisheries
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Publication:2486663
DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2003.12.008zbMATH Open1112.91319OpenAlexW2007209865MaRDI QIDQ2486663FDOQ2486663
Authors: Frances R. Homans, James E. Wilen
Publication date: 5 August 2005
Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2003.12.008
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- Rational taxation in an open access fishery model
- Open access fisheries utilization with an endogenous regulatory structure: An expanded analysis
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