A reinforcement learning process in extensive form games

DOI10.1007/S001820400194zbMATH Open1071.91010OpenAlexW2060125999MaRDI QIDQ2487965FDOQ2487965

Authors: Jean-François Laslier, Bernard Walliser 

Publication date: 17 August 2005

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400194

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zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumPolya process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cited In (6)

• Transient and asymptotic dynamics of reinforcement learning in games
• A generalized approach to belief learning in repeated games
• Aspiration-based reinforcement learning in repeated interaction games: An overview
• Solving for Best Responses and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games with Reinforcement Learning Methods
• Reinforcement Learning rules in a repeated game
• Generalized reinforcement learning in perfect-information games

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