Bargaining sets in exchange economies with indivisibilities and money

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Publication:2487970





In exchange economies with \(N\) agents, a finite set of indivisible goods and one perfectly divisible good (money) the authors study solution concepts (different kinds of bargaining sets) known from theory of cooperative games. Under conditions they dicuss non-voidness of the introduced solution sets and relations between properties (coincidence of bargaining sets and cores) of the considered economies and associated games. Interesting examples check the stated conditions. So e.g., it is shown that the quasilinearity of the utility functions, representing the preference relations of agents, cannot be omitted in order to guarantee non-voidness as spoken about above.











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