A note on Linsky's \textit{Referring}

DOI10.1305/NDJFL/1093890633MaRDI QIDQ2544375zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors R. B. jun. Redom

Publication date 1972

Published in Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1093890633

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Review text

In his book ``Referring [New York: Humanities Press (1967)], \textit{Leonard Linsky} claims that one of Russell's arguments for the claim that definite descriptions are not names is circular. Russell claims that (1) ``Scott is the author of `Waverly' does not have the same meaning as (2) ``Scott is Scott. Thus ``the author of `Waverly' , a definite description, cannot be a name like ``Scott. Linsky claims that the argument is circular because we couldn't know that (1) and (2) have different meanings unless we know that ``the author of `Waverly' is not a name to begin with. I claim that Russell, and we, know that (1) and (2) mean different things without assuming that definite descriptions are not names.

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Cited in

(1)

• Russell's descriptivism about proper names and indexicals: reconstruction and defense

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