Chaotic banking crises and regulations
DOI10.1007/S00199-016-0952-9zbMATH Open1367.91111OpenAlexW2290311281MaRDI QIDQ255171FDOQ255171
Authors: Jess Benhabib, Jianjun Miao, Pengfei Wang 
Publication date: 9 March 2016
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0952-9
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chaosbanking crisiscoordination failureincentive constraintsrisk takingrisk-shiftingself-fulfilling equilibria
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Strange attractors, chaotic dynamics of systems with hyperbolic behavior (37D45) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Economic dynamics (91B55)
Cites Work
- Absolutely continuous invariant measures for one-parameter families of one-dimensional maps
- Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
- On Endogenous Competitive Business Cycles
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Period Three Implies Chaos
- Debt Constrained Asset Markets
- Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Chaotic equilibria in models with backward dynamics
- Banking bubbles and financial crises
Cited In (11)
- Cycles and self-fulfilling crises in open economies with stock collateral constraints under impatience
- Optimal capital requirements with noisy signals on banking risk
- Credit search and credit cycles
- Introduction to the symposium on bubbles, multiple equilibria, and economic activities
- Deterministic debt cycles in open economies with flow collateral constraints
- Crisis contracts
- Dynamical analysis of a banking duopoly model with capital regulation and asymmetric costs
- Some lessons for regulation from recent bank crises
- Looting and risk shifting in banking crises
- Capital regulation and banking bubbles
- DO RISK PREMIA PROTECT AGAINST BANKING CRISES?
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