Rejoinder: ``On the Birnbaum argument for the strong likelihood principle
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Publication:257694
DOI10.1214/14-STS482zbMath1332.62026arXiv1411.0812OpenAlexW3106397631MaRDI QIDQ257694
Publication date: 17 March 2016
Published in: Statistical Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1411.0812
Sampling theory, sample surveys (62D05) Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Sufficient statistics and fields (62B05)
Cites Work
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- Allan Birnbaum's conception of statistical evidence
- The Neyman-Pearson theory as decision theory, and as inference theory; with a criticism of the Lindley-Savage argument for Bayesian theory
- Some Problems Connected with Statistical Inference
- On the Foundations of Statistical Inference
- On principles and arguments to likelihood
- Sufficiency and conditionality
- More on Concepts of Statistical Evidence
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