Delegation and information sharing in Cournot duopoly

DOI10.1007/s00712-007-0265-3zbMath1411.91383OpenAlexW1973578955MaRDI QIDQ2631970

Bernd Theilen

Publication date: 16 May 2019

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0265-3

zbMATH Keywords

information sharingdelegationmanagerial contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (1)

Cooperation in a differentiated duopoly when information is dispersed: a beauty contest game with endogenous concern for coordination

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