Vagueness: Why do we believe in tolerance?
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Publication:266648
DOI10.1007/S10992-015-9352-ZzbMATH Open1336.03008OpenAlexW1964450031MaRDI QIDQ266648FDOQ266648
Authors: Paul Égré
Publication date: 13 April 2016
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-015-9352-z
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Cites Work
- Tolerant, classical, strict
- Tolerance and mixed consequence in the S'valuationist setting
- A model of tolerance
- Vagueness, truth and logic
- Wang's paradox
- Higher-order sorites paradox
- Borel on the heap
- Perceptual Ambiguity and the Sorites
- Vagueness as probabilistic linguistic knowledge
- Is Higher Order Vagueness Coherent?
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Sorting out the sorites
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- An Introduction to Uncertainty in Measurement
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Vagueness, tolerance and contextual logic
Cited In (9)
- Tolerance and mixed consequence in the S'valuationist setting
- Williamson's master argument on vagueness
- Truth meets vagueness. Unifying the semantic and the soritical paradoxes
- Vagueness, tolerance and non-transitive entailment
- The bridge principle and stigmatized truth-values
- Comparing some substructural strategies dealing with vagueness
- Adjectival vagueness in a Bayesian model of interpretation
- Tolerance and higher-order vagueness
- Probabilistic approaches to vagueness and semantic competency
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