Pirates in wonderland: liquid democracy has bicriteria guarantees

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_26MaRDI QIDQ2670943zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jonathan A. Noel, Mashbat Suzuki, Adrian Vetta

Publication date 1 June 2022

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.05142

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Abstract: Liquid democracy has a natural graphical representation, the delegation graph. Consequently, the strategic aspects of liquid democracy can be studied as a game over delegation graphs, called the liquid democracy game. Our main result is that this game has bicriteria approximation guarantees, in terms of both rationality and social welfare. Specifically, we prove the price of stability for $epsilon$-Nash equilibria is exactly $epsilon$ in the liquid democracy game.

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Cites work

• Binary voting with delegable proxy: an analysis of liquid democracy
• The convergence of iterative delegations in liquid democracy in a social network
• The fluid mechanics of liquid democracy

Cited in

(3)

• An approval-based model for single-step liquid democracy
• The fluid mechanics of liquid democracy
• The convergence of iterative delegations in liquid democracy in a social network

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