Pirates in wonderland: liquid democracy has bicriteria guarantees

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_26zbMATH Open1492.91265arXiv2105.05142OpenAlexW3204961839MaRDI QIDQ2670943FDOQ2670943

Adrian Vetta, Mashbat Suzuki, Jonathan A. Noel

Publication date: 1 June 2022

Abstract: Liquid democracy has a natural graphical representation, the delegation graph. Consequently, the strategic aspects of liquid democracy can be studied as a game over delegation graphs, called the liquid democracy game. Our main result is that this game has bicriteria approximation guarantees, in terms of both rationality and social welfare. Specifically, we prove the price of stability for $epsilon$-Nash equilibria is exactly $epsilon$ in the liquid democracy game.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.05142

Recommendations

• The fluid mechanics of liquid democracy
• Liquid democracy: an algorithmic perspective
• Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour
• Binary voting with delegable proxy: an analysis of liquid democracy
• Short paper: ballot secrecy for liquid democracy
• An approval-based model for single-step liquid democracy
• On parameterized complexity of liquid democracy
• Democracy and dynamic welfare optima
• On guarantees, vetoes, and random dictators

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Cites Work

• The fluid mechanics of liquid democracy
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The convergence of iterative delegations in liquid democracy in a social network

This page was built for publication: Pirates in wonderland: liquid democracy has bicriteria guarantees

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2670943)