Terminological varieties and misconceptions in probability
The article reviews some important interpretations, discrepancies and misconceptions relating to probability, in their historical context. More concretely, the authors discuss theoretical and terminological disagreements regarding the indifference principle and probabilistic logic. The proposed interpretations and understandings are discussed based on L. J. Savage's subjective theory of probability in comparison to objectivistic approaches. The paper is of particular interest to specialists interested in the philosophy of probability (and mathematics in general), and the theoretical justifications of probabilistic and statistical inference.
- Classical Probability in the Enlightenment, New Edition
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3113188 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3434895 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3214063 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the Correct Use of Bayes' Formula
- On de Finetti's instrumentalist philosophy of probability
- A review of dimensional assessment for statistics and probability
- On Peirce's 1878 article `\textit{The probability of induction}': a conceptualistic appraisal
- Another view of the classical problem of comparing two probabilities
- The limitation of Bayesianism
This page was built for publication: Terminological varieties and misconceptions in probability
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2680657)