Risk Aversion in Modeling of Cap-and-Trade Mechanism and Optimal Design of Emission Markets

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-23425-0_10zbMath1334.91055OpenAlexW2199163784MaRDI QIDQ2801797

Juri Hinz, Paolo Falbo

Publication date: 22 April 2016

Published in: Stochastics of Environmental and Financial Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23425-0_10

zbMATH Keywords

general equilibriumrisk aversionenvironmental policyrisk-neutral measureemission marketssocial burden

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (1)

Optimal dynamic regulation of carbon emissions market

Cites Work

• Environmental economics and modeling marketable permits
• On fair pricing of emission-related derivatives
• Dynamic behavior of CO\(_2\) spot prices
• A dynamic analysis of the marketable permits approach to global warming policy: A comparison of spatial and temporal flexibility
• The Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Price Formation for Allowances and CERs
• Optimal Stochastic Control and Carbon Price Formation
• Market Design for Emission Trading Schemes

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