The clean development mechanism and joint price formation for allowances and CERs

DOI10.1007/978-3-0348-0021-1_21MaRDI QIDQ2904886zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Max Fehr, René Carmona

Publication date 24 August 2012

Published in Seminar on Stochastic Analysis, Random Fields and Applications VI (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-0348-0021-1_21

zbMATH Keywords

environmental riskKyoto protocolcap-and-tradeenergy economicscarbon markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Applications of stochastic analysis (to PDEs, etc.) (60H30) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Financial applications of other theories (91G80)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1376935 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1860211 (Why is no real title available?)
• A model of intertemporal emission trading, banking, and borrowing
• Optimal stochastic control and carbon price formation
• Solving an equilibrium model for trade of \(\text{CO}_2\) emission permits
• The economics of pollution permit banking in the context of Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments

Cited in

(5)

• Market-consistent modeling for cap-and-trade schemes and application to option pricing
• Preemption by baseline
• Risk Aversion in Modeling of Cap-and-Trade Mechanism and Optimal Design of Emission Markets
• The influencing factors of sCER price dynamics under the clean development mechanism: theory and econometric analysis
• Risk-averse equilibrium modeling and social optimality of cap-and-trade mechanisms

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