Characterizations of Three Linear Values for TU Games by Associated Consistency: Simple Proofs Using the Jordan Normal Form
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Publication:2802699
DOI10.1142/S0219198916500031zbMath1372.91004OpenAlexW2163754384WikidataQ113776914 ScholiaQ113776914MaRDI QIDQ2802699
Philippe Solal, Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila
Publication date: 27 April 2016
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198916500031
Shapley valueJordan normal formassociated consistencyequal allocation of nonseparable costscenter of imputation set
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- Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
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- Associated consistency characterization of two linear values for TU games by matrix approach
- Matrix analysis for associated consistency in cooperative game theory
- A MATRIX APPROACH TO THE ASSOCIATED CONSISTENCY WITH AN APPLICATION TO THE SHAPLEY VALUE
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
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