Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form

DOI10.1142/S0219198916500031MaRDI QIDQ2802699zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal

Publication date 27 April 2016

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198916500031

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueJordan normal formassociated consistencyequal allocation of nonseparable costscenter of imputation set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Canonical forms, reductions, classification (15A21)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47926 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• A matrix approach to associated consistency of the Shapley value for games in generalized characteristic function form
• A matrix approach to the associated consistency with an application to the Shapley value
• Associated consistency and Shapley value
• Associated consistency characterization of two linear values for TU games by matrix approach
• Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• Matrix analysis for associated consistency in cooperative game theory
• Matrix approach to dual similar associated consistency for the Shapley value

Cited in

(4)

• A dynamic transfer scheme deriving from the dual similar associated game
• Necessary players, myerson fairness and the equal treatment of equals
• New characterizations of the discounted Shapley values
• Procedural interpretation and associated consistency for the Egalitarian Shapley values

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