Pollution permit systems and firm dynamics: how does the allocation scheme matter?

DOI10.1111/IERE.12157MaRDI QIDQ2802723zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Evangelina Dardati

Publication date 27 April 2016

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12157

zbMATH Keywords

firm dynamicspermit allocation schemespollution permit systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• Marketable permits in a stochastic dynamic model of the firm
• Optimal pollution permit endowments in markets with endogenous emissions.
• On pollution permits and abatement
• Pollution control and the dynamics of the firm: The effects of market-based instruments on optimal firm investments
• On the long-run efficiency of auctioned vs. free permits

Cites work

• Adjuncts and minimalist grammars
• Allocation of CO\(_2\) emissions permits: A general equilibrium analysis of policy instruments
• Entry, Exit, and firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium
• Estimating Production Functions Using Inputs to Control for Unobservables
• Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work

Cited in

(2)

• Are emissions permits regressive?
• Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?

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