Pollution permit systems and firm dynamics: how does the allocation scheme matter?
DOI10.1111/IERE.12157zbMATH Open1404.91222OpenAlexW2259212147MaRDI QIDQ2802723FDOQ2802723
Authors: Evangelina Dardati
Publication date: 27 April 2016
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12157
Recommendations
- Marketable permits in a stochastic dynamic model of the firm
- Optimal pollution permit endowments in markets with endogenous emissions.
- On pollution permits and abatement
- Pollution control and the dynamics of the firm: The effects of market-based instruments on optimal firm investments
- On the long-run efficiency of auctioned vs. free permits
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)
Cites Work
- Estimating Production Functions Using Inputs to Control for Unobservables
- Entry, Exit, and firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium
- Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work
- Allocation of CO\(_2\) emissions permits: A general equilibrium analysis of policy instruments
- Adjuncts and minimalist grammars
Cited In (2)
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