Forgery and subkey recovery on CAESAR candidate iFeed

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-31301-6_11MaRDI QIDQ2807205zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Willem Schroé, Bart Mennink, E. A. Andreeva, Bart Preneel

Publication date 19 May 2016

Published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31301-6_11

zbMATH Keywords

forgeryCAESARbreaking forward secrecyiFeedsubkey recovery

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

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Cites work

• How to securely release unverified plaintext in authenticated encryption

Cited in

(4)

• Blockcipher-based authenticated encryption: how small can we go?
• Universal forgery and key recovery attacks on ELmD authenticated encryption algorithm
• Reforgeability of authenticated encryption schemes
• Cryptanalysis of OCB2: attacks on authenticity and confidentiality

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