Analysis of the CAESAR candidate silver

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-31301-6_28zbMATH Open1396.94085OpenAlexW2466016796MaRDI QIDQ2807229FDOQ2807229

Authors: Jérémy Jean, Yu Sasaki, Lei Wang 

Publication date: 19 May 2016

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31301-6_28

Recommendations

• Can CAESAR beat Galois? Robustness of CAESAR candidates against nonce reusing and high data complexity attacks
• Collision attacks against CAESAR candidates. Forgery and key-recovery against AEZ and Marble
• The \texttt{Deoxys} AEAD family
• Practical Cryptanalysis of PAES
• Exploiting the leakage: analysis of some authenticated encryption schemes

zbMATH Keywords

authenticated encryptionkey recoverysilverforgeryCAESARplaintext recovery

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Cites Work

• Tweaks and Keys for Block Ciphers: The TWEAKEY Framework
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The software performance of authenticated-encryption modes
• Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and Refinements to Modes OCB and PMAC
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Improved differential attacks for ECHO and Grøstl
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The block cipher \textsc{Square}
• Improved key recovery attacks on reduced-round AES in the single-key setting
• A Classical Introduction to Cryptography

Cited In (3)

• Cryptanalysis of reduced NORX
• Can CAESAR beat Galois? Robustness of CAESAR candidates against nonce reusing and high data complexity attacks
• Collision attacks against CAESAR candidates. Forgery and key-recovery against AEZ and Marble

Uses Software

• tweakey
• Square

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