Set Identification in Models with Multiple Equilibria

DOI10.1093/restud/rdr008zbMath1274.91098arXiv2102.12249OpenAlexW3132111533MaRDI QIDQ2857652

Alfred Galichon, Marc Henry

Publication date: 5 November 2013

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.12249

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriaoptimal transportidentified setcore determining classes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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