INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES AND FUZZY ARROW'S THEOREM

DOI10.1142/S1793005712400121zbMath1288.91071MaRDI QIDQ2873491

John N. Mordeson, Michael B. Gibilisco, Terry D. Clark

Publication date: 24 January 2014

Published in: New Mathematics and Natural Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s1793005712400121

zbMATH Keywords

independence of irrelevant alternatives; Arrow's theorem; fuzzy aggregation rules; nondictatorship; fuzzy preference profiles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

03E72: Theory of fuzzy sets, etc.

91B10: Group preferences

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Arrow theorems in the fuzzy setting, Fuzzy Arrovian Theorems when preferences are complete, Arrow-type results under fuzzy preferences based on filter and ultrafilter, A new view on Arrovian dictatorship in a fuzzy setting

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