AN “i” FOR ANi: SINGULAR TERMS, UNIQUENESS, AND REFERENCE
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Publication:2919944
DOI10.1017/S1755020311000347zbMath1272.03041MaRDI QIDQ2919944
Publication date: 23 October 2012
Published in: The Review of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
natural deduction; philosophy of language; definite descriptions; singular terms; donkey anaphora; mathematical languages; singular pronouns
Cites Work
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