An Answer to Hellman's Question: ‘Does Category Theory Provide a Framework for Mathematical Structuralism?’†

DOI10.1093/PHILMAT/12.1.54MaRDI QIDQ4470296zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steve Awodey

Publication date 22 June 2004

Published in Philosophia Mathematica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/d4a96e2522fad66c0d4779e02cd0c0d527902ff8

zbMATH Keywords

categorical structuralismschematic statements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Topoi (18B25) Foundations, relations to logic and deductive systems (18A15)

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Cited in

(21)

• Categories, Structures, and the Frege-Hilbert Controversy: The Status of Meta-mathematics
• Does Category Theory Provide a Framework for Mathematical Structuralism?†
• Towards a new epistemology of mathematics
• Structuralism and meta-mathematics
• How to be a structuralist all the way down
• Life on the Ship of Neurath: Mathematics in the Philosophy of Mathematics
• What is categorical structuralism?
• The scope of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem
• Learning from Questions on Categorical Foundations
• On three arguments against categorical structuralism
• Structuralism and category theory in the contemporary philosophy of mathematics
• Categories for the working mathematician: making the impossible possible
• Structuralism as a philosophy of mathematical practice
• NEITHER CATEGORICAL NOR SET-THEORETIC FOUNDATIONS
• An ``\(i\) for an \(i\): singular terms, uniqueness, and reference
• Transfinite recursion and computation in the iterative conception of set
• Indispensability and the problem of compatible explanations. A reply to `Should scientific realists be Platonists?'
• The mathematical description of a generic physical system
• Univalent foundations as structuralist foundations
• Categories without structures
• Comparing material and structural set theories

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