An Answer to Hellman's Question: ‘Does Category Theory Provide a Framework for Mathematical Structuralism?’†

DOI10.1093/philmat/12.1.54zbMath1065.18002OpenAlexW2172274655MaRDI QIDQ4470296

Steven Awodey

Publication date: 22 June 2004

Published in: Philosophia Mathematica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/d4a96e2522fad66c0d4779e02cd0c0d527902ff8

zbMATH Keywords

categorical structuralismschematic statements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Topoi (18B25) Foundations, relations to logic and deductive systems (18A15)

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