Indispensability and the problem of compatible explanations. A reply to `Should scientific realists be Platonists?'
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Publication:516227
DOI10.1007/s11229-015-0667-7zbMath1358.00099OpenAlexW115377556MaRDI QIDQ516227
Publication date: 14 March 2017
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0667-7
underdeterminationinference to the best explanationmathematical explanationenhanced indispensability argumentmathematical nominalism
Cites Work
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- Should scientific realists be Platonists?
- Magicicada, mathematical explanation and mathematical realism
- Inference to the best explanation and mathematical realism
- Plato's Problem
- Mathematics and Scientific Representation
- Indispensability and Explanation
- The Enhanced Indispensability Argument: Representational versus Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Science
- Mathematical Explanation in Science
- The Explanatory Power of Phase Spaces
- An Answer to Hellman's Question: ‘Does Category Theory Provide a Framework for Mathematical Structuralism?’†
- Scientific Realism and the Indispensability Argument for Mathematical Realism: A Marriage Made in Hell
- Living in Harmony: Nominalism and the Explanationist Argument for Realism
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