Composable security of delegated quantum computation

From MaRDI portal
Publication:2936621

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-45608-8_22zbMATH Open1318.68077arXiv1301.3662OpenAlexW2130618624WikidataQ59202458 ScholiaQ59202458MaRDI QIDQ2936621FDOQ2936621


Authors: Vedran Dunjko, Joseph Fitzsimons, Christopher Portmann, R. Renner Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 6 January 2015

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Delegating difficult computations to remote large computation facilities, with appropriate security guarantees, is a possible solution for the ever-growing needs of personal computing power. For delegated computation protocols to be usable in a larger context---or simply to securely run two protocols in parallel---the security definitions need to be composable. Here, we define composable security for delegated quantum computation. We distinguish between protocols which provide only blindness---the computation is hidden from the server---and those that are also verifiable---the client can check that it has received the correct result. We show that the composable security definition capturing both these notions can be reduced to a combination of several distinct "trace-distance-type" criteria---which are, individually, non-composable security definitions. Additionally, we study the security of some known delegated quantum computation protocols, including Broadbent, Fitzsimons and Kashefi's Universal Blind Quantum Computation protocol. Even though these protocols were originally proposed with insufficient security criteria, they turn out to still be secure given the stronger composable definitions.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1301.3662




Recommendations




Cited In (19)





This page was built for publication: Composable security of delegated quantum computation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2936621)