A Polynomial-Time Attack on the BBCRS Scheme

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Publication:2941191

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-46447-2_8zbMATH Open1345.94054arXiv1501.03736OpenAlexW1562964166WikidataQ62039159 ScholiaQ62039159MaRDI QIDQ2941191FDOQ2941191


Authors: Alain Couvreur, Ayoub Otmani, Jean-Pierre Tillich, Valérie Gauthier-Umaña Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 27 August 2015

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: The BBCRS scheme is a variant of the McEliece public-key encryption scheme where the hiding phase is performed by taking the inverse of a matrix which is of the form mathbfT+mathbfR where mathbfT is a sparse matrix with average row/column weight equal to a very small quantity m, usually m<2, and mathbfR is a matrix of small rank zgeqslant1. The rationale of this new transformation is the reintroduction of families of codes, like generalized Reed-Solomon codes, that are famously known for representing insecure choices. We present a key-recovery attack when z=1 and m is chosen between 1 and 1+R+O(frac1sqrtn) where R denotes the code rate. This attack has complexity O(n6) and breaks all the parameters suggested in the literature.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1501.03736




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