Insider-proof encryption with applications for quantum key distribution

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-04268-8_8zbMATH Open1395.94303arXiv1209.4696OpenAlexW1467789627MaRDI QIDQ2948258FDOQ2948258

Authors: Matthew McKague, Lana Sheridan 

Publication date: 30 September 2015

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: It has been pointed out that current protocols for device independent quantum key distribution can leak key to the adversary when devices are used repeatedly and that this issue has not been addressed. We introduce the notion of an insider-proof channel. This allows us to propose a means by which devices with memories could be reused from one run of a device independent quantum key distribution protocol to the next while bounding the leakage to Eve, under the assumption that one run of the protocol could be completed securely using devices with memories.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1209.4696

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Quantum cryptography (quantum-theoretic aspects) (81P94)

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