Collusive attacks to ``circle-type multi-party quantum key agreement protocols

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Publication:296141

DOI10.1007/S11128-016-1264-5zbMATH Open1338.81169arXiv1602.00393OpenAlexW2283493637MaRDI QIDQ296141FDOQ296141

Di Xiao, Run-Zong Liu, Heng-Yue Jia, Bin Liu

Publication date: 14 June 2016

Published in: Quantum Information Processing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We find that existing multi-party quantum key agreement (MQKA) protocols designed for fairness of the key are, in fact, unfair. Our analysis shows that these protocols are sensitive to collusive attacks; that is, dishonest participants can collaborate to predetermine the key without being detected. In fact, the transmission structures of the quantum particles in those unfair MQKA protocols, three of which have already been analyzed, have much in common. We call these unfair MQKA protocols circle-type MQKA protocols. Likewise, the transmission structures of the quantum particles in MQKA protocols that can resist collusive attacks are also similar. We call such protocols complete-graph-type MQKA protocols. A MQKA protocol also exists that can resist the above attacks but is still not fair, and we call it the tree-type MQKA protocol. We first point out a common, easily missed loophole that severely compromises the fairness of present circle-type MQKA protocols. Then we show that two dishonest participants at special positions can totally predetermine the key generated by circle-type MQKA protocols. We anticipate that our observations will contribute to secure and fair MQKA protocols, especially circle-type protocols.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.00393





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