Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities

DOI10.1093/BJPS/AXU036zbMATH Open1384.03061OpenAlexW2006631031MaRDI QIDQ2965415FDOQ2965415

Matthew Parrott

Publication date: 3 March 2017

Published in: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/bayesian-models-delusional-beliefs-and-epistemic-possibilities(a2a7c1fa-9fb3-4b55-8db7-8ae6a3a9df86).html

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Cited In (3)

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