Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities

DOI10.1093/BJPS/AXU036MaRDI QIDQ2965415zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthew Parrott

Publication date 3 March 2017

Published in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/bayesian-models-delusional-beliefs-and-epistemic-possibilities(a2a7c1fa-9fb3-4b55-8db7-8ae6a3a9df86).html

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

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