Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_16zbMath1384.03107OpenAlexW4244207505MaRDI QIDQ2971681

Hans Rott

Publication date: 7 April 2017

Published in: Readings in Formal Epistemology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/25382/1/ubr12695_ocr.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Cites Work

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• Two methods of constructing contractions and revisions of knowledge systems
• Note on preference and axioms of choice
• Maps between some different kinds of contraction function: the finite case
• Two modellings for theory change
• Ordering semantics and premise semantics for counterfactuals
• Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
• Propositional knowledge base revision and minimal change
• What does a conditional knowledge base entail?
• Preferential belief change using generalized epistemic entrenchment
• Basic entrenchment
• On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions
• Ordinal Preference and Rational Choice
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions

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