Ordering semantics and premise semantics for counterfactuals

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Publication:1158414


DOI10.1007/BF00248850zbMath0473.03015MaRDI QIDQ1158414

David Lewis

Publication date: 1981

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)


03B45: Modal logic (including the logic of norms)

03A05: Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations


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