Epistemic closure and epistemic logic. I: Relevant alternatives and subjunctivism
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2018588
DOI10.1007/s10992-013-9306-2zbMath1318.03028OpenAlexW2004614332WikidataQ59413146 ScholiaQ59413146MaRDI QIDQ2018588
Publication date: 24 March 2015
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.306.8434
sensitivitytrackingmodal logicsafetyepistemic logicepistemologyrelevant alternativesepistemic closuresubjunctivism
Related Items (8)
Closure of a priori knowability under a priori knowable material implication ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Epistemic Logic with Evidence and Relevant Alternatives ⋮ Prioritised ceteris paribus logic for counterfactual reasoning ⋮ Transmission arguments against knowledge closure are still fallacious ⋮ Multi-path vs. single-path replies to skepticism ⋮ Epistemic logic, monotonicity, and the Halbach-Welch rapprochement strategy ⋮ A Computational Learning Semantics for Inductive Empirical Knowledge
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Why safety doesn't save closure
- Dealing with logical omniscience: expressiveness and pragmatics
- A strategy for assessing closure
- Ordering semantics and premise semantics for counterfactuals
- The effect of bounding the number of primitive propositions and the depth of nesting on the complexity of modal logic
- Towards closure on closure
- Antecedent-relative comparative world similarity
- Elusive Knowledge
- When epistemic closure does and does not fail: a lesson from the history of epistemology
- A logical analysis of some value concepts
- Epistemic Logic, Relevant Alternatives, and the Dynamics of Context
- Roles, Rigidity, and Quantification in Epistemic Logic
- Characterizing the NP-PSPACE Gap in the Satisfiability Problem for Modal Logic
- Completeness and decidability of three logics of counterfactual conditionals1
This page was built for publication: Epistemic closure and epistemic logic. I: Relevant alternatives and subjunctivism