When epistemic closure does and does not fail: a lesson from the history of epistemology

DOI10.1111/J.0003-2638.2004.00457.XzbMATH Open1042.03516OpenAlexW1967545131MaRDI QIDQ4469738FDOQ4469738

Authors: Ted A. Warfield 

Publication date: 18 June 2004

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00457.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) History of mathematical logic and foundations (03-03)

Cited In (5)

• A strategy for assessing closure
• Towards closure on closure
• Transmission arguments against knowledge closure are still fallacious
• Epistemic closure and epistemic logic. I: Relevant alternatives and subjunctivism
• Epistemic closure, skepticism and defeasibility

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