Exponent blinding does not always lift (partial) spa resistance to higher-level security

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-21554-4_5zbMATH Open1352.94058OpenAlexW2104435792MaRDI QIDQ3011304FDOQ3011304

Authors: Werner Schindler, Kouichi Itoh 

Publication date: 28 June 2011

Published in: Applied Cryptography and Network Security (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21554-4_5

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Progress in Cryptology – Mycrypt 2005
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Vulnerability in RSA Implementations Due to Instruction Cache Analysis and Its Demonstration on OpenSSL
• Correcting errors in RSA private keys
• Power Attack on Small RSA Public Exponent

Cited In (3)

• Public Key Cryptography - PKC 2006
• Attacking randomized exponentiations using unsupervised learning
• A third is all you need: extended partial key exposure attack on CRT-RSA with additive exponent blinding

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