Exponent blinding does not always lift (partial) spa resistance to higher-level security

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-21554-4_5MaRDI QIDQ3011304zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Werner Schindler, Kouichi Itoh

Publication date 28 June 2011

Published in Applied Cryptography and Network Security (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21554-4_5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2085436 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1979280 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1504818 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1418307 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 233957 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Vulnerability in RSA Implementations Due to Instruction Cache Analysis and Its Demonstration on OpenSSL
• Correcting errors in RSA private keys
• Power Attack on Small RSA Public Exponent
• Progress in Cryptology – Mycrypt 2005
• Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems

Cited in

(3)

• Public Key Cryptography - PKC 2006
• Attacking randomized exponentiations using unsupervised learning
• A third is all you need: extended partial key exposure attack on CRT-RSA with additive exponent blinding

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