Attacking Exponent Blinding in RSA without CRT

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-29912-4_7MaRDI QIDQ4905046zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sven Bauer

Publication date 14 February 2013

Published in Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29912-4_7

zbMATH Keywords

RSAexponent blindingsimple power analysis (SPA)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

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Cited in

(20)

• ROSETTA for single trace analysis
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2085435 (Why is no real title available?)
• Correlation analysis against protected SFM implementations of RSA
• Weaknesses in current RSA signature schemes
• Public Key Cryptography - PKC 2006
• Progress in Cryptology – Mycrypt 2005
• Exclusive exponent blinding may not suffice to prevent timing attacks on RSA
• Correlated extra-reductions defeat blinded regular exponentiation
• Attacking embedded ECC implementations through CMOV side channels
• Thwarting side-channel analysis against RSA cryptosystems with additive blinding
• Power Attack on Small RSA Public Exponent
• A third is all you need: extended partial key exposure attack on CRT-RSA with additive exponent blinding
• Attacking randomized exponentiations using unsupervised learning
• Attacking unbalanced RSA-CRT using SPA.
• A secure exponentiation algorithm resistant to a combined attack on RSA implementation
• Exponent blinding does not always lift (partial) spa resistance to higher-level security
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1979287 (Why is no real title available?)
• Defeating RSA multiply-always and message blinding countermeasures
• On the use of RSA public exponent to improve implementation efficiency and side-channel resistance
• Stochastic methods defeat regular RSA exponentiation algorithms with combined blinding methods

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